作　　者： (曹宗宏）; ;

机构地区： 安徽农业大学理学院应用数学研究所

出　　处： 《系统工程学报》 2008年第1期67-73,共7页

摘　　要： 考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链,供应商提供给零售商单一产品,而零售商的市场需求依赖于该产品的货架展示量和零售价格.首先得出了供需双方在分散式系统下无法实现供应链完美协调,并给出了供应商的最优决策;其次,作为Stackelberg的主导方,供应商分别给出全数量折扣和增量折扣定价策略,得出了实现系统完美协调的条件;最后,通过数值实例对上面的结论进行释义和说明,并分析了批发价格对供需双方收益的影响. In this paper, we consider two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and one retailer. The supplier provides an item to the retailer facing demand assumed to be dependent on the amount of inventory displayed on the retailer＇ s shelf and retail price. Firstly, the supply chain cannot be the perfect coordination under decentralized system, and the optimal wholesale price is discussed. Then we introduce quantity discount pricing strategies with considers both all units discount and incremental quantity discount under Stackelberg game model, and its necessary condition is developed to achieve the perfect coordination; Finally, a numeric example interprets the above conclusion and the effect about profits of each number under variety of wholesale price when system is the perfect coordination.

关 键 词： 需求与货架展示量相关 数量折扣 博弈 完美协调

领　　域： [理学—运筹学与控制论] [理学—数学]