作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《中国行政管理》 2019年第1期80-87,共8页

摘　　要： 公共政策执行问题是困扰中国基层治理的长期难题。对于政策执行问题存在的原因,学术界进行了较为充分的讨论,但既有研究对基层政府与执行者的角色大都秉持"经济人"的理论假设,从而在解决方式上形成加强监督考核或压缩基层政策执行自主权的单向思维。本文通过对A市檀乡信访维稳"属地管理"政策案例的分析,指出严密的考核与功利主义的激励并不能保证政策在基层的有效执行。中国政策执行研究需要充分考虑我国特殊的政策执行情境,在政策过程框架内重新反思基层政策执行中的专断性权力和基础性权力双重弱化的实际,避免对基层执行者的过分苛责与污名化。 Public policy implementation has troubled China’s grassroots governance for a long time. The reasons for the problems of policy implementation have been fully discussed in academic circles. However, the existing researches mostly assume the local government as "economic person" in theoretical hypothesis, thus formed a one-way thinking of strengthening the supervision and assessment or reducing the autonomy of grassroots policy implementation. This article analyzes the implementation of "apanage management" policy in Tan village, stating that the strict assessment and utilitarian incentive cannot guarantee the effective implementation at the grassroots level. The researches on policy implementation in China need to fully consider China’s special policy implementation context and rethink the dual weakening of arbitrary power and infrastructural power in the implementation of grass-roots policies within the framework of policy process to avoid excessive criticism and stigmatization of grassroots executives.

关 键 词： 信访维稳 属地管理 政策执行

分 类 号： [D035]

领　　域： []