作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《金融研究》 2015年第8期159-174,共16页

摘　　要： 以2003—2011年我国A股上市公司的股价暴跌风险为切入点，本文考察了税收征管在投资者利益保护过程中的治理功能、作用机理和作用边界。本文发现，更强的税收征管力度能够通过促使上市公司及时释放坏消息的方式，显著降低其股价暴跌风险，从而起到投资者利益保护的作用。但进一步的研究也发现，税收征管的上述治理功能只存在于民企及居于市场化程度较高地区的公司中。本文揭示了税收征管对于投资者利益保护的重要作用，强调了其作为外部治理机制的可行性和重要性。 From the perspective of Chinese listed companies during 2003 to 2011, this paper investigate the governance role and its mechanism and boarder of tax enforcement in the process of investor protection. We find that, the stock crash risk is significantly decreased by stronger tax enforcement by inducing the listed companies realease bad news in a more timely manner, so as to play the role of investor protection. While further study also finds that the governance role of tax enforcement only exist in the private firms and the areas with higher mar- ketization degree. This paper indicates the important role of tax enforcement for investor protection, and empha- sises the feasibility of taking the tax enforcement as an external governance mechanism.

关 键 词： 税收征管力度 投资者保护 股价暴跌风险

分 类 号： [G34 G12]

领　　域： [] []