导　　师： 宋献中

学科专业： 120201

授予学位： 博士

作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

摘　　要： 西方理论论述了并购的动因,但国内学者主要关注并购本身的价值创造性,其结论的差异佐证了中国并购市场政府控制因素的重要性。政府控制并购的初始动因和路径传承是减少财政负担,但上市公司股权收购中政府控制方式有所变化。在此背景下,研究政府控制与公司并购的关系,有利于梳理并购机理和规范公司行为。 本文遵循“企业控制权/(根源/)—政府控制/(动因/)—并购模式/(行为/)—公司绩效/(结果/)”研究思路,在企业性质、行政级别、金字塔层级、控股方式、控股比例和地区差异等方面,研究了政府控制下的公司并购模式及绩效,主要特色在于政府控制的微观动因视角、并购模式的政府行为特色、绩效影响路径的实证性和数据验证的匹配性。 理论分析表明,政府控制权的实质是可分割的实际控制权;基于政府控制权分割基础上形成的政府控制方式蕴含着政府控制并购的动因;政府控制具有正、负两种效应,其中基于名义剩余控制权和政府控制权分离基础上的目标多元性、廉价投票权和寻租等代理问题,是政府过度干预并购并造成其效率低下的根源。 实证研究发现,公司并购行业属性取决于企业性质和行政级别,关联属性取决于企业性质、控股方式和控股比例,而区域属性取决于企业性质、行政级别和地区差异。公司整体绩效证实了两个悖论,但与关联属性和区域属性无显著相关性;政府控制下并购模式对绩效的影响证实了政府控制的动因。 政府控制的正效应是高级别政府对企业盲目多元化的抑制和高级别政府控制企业多元化并购的协同效应动因共存,负效应是:低级别政府控制企业过度多元化的侵害效应;关联并购中报表重组的政府内部资本市场机会主义运用;地方政府利用同区域并购对中央政府控制企业的经济负担转嫁和对本地上市公司的利益输送;政府控股比例与利用关联并购进行报表重组可能性的正向关系;高干预地区政府对本地企业收购外地企业的鼓励和对外地企业收购本地企业的限制。 发挥并购功效的关键是防止政府的过度干预,基本原则是政府职能的合理定位,减持国有股并培育责任大股东,加强证券监管和机构投资者监督以及改善法人治理结构。 Western theories discuss acquiring motives, but domestic scholars mainly notice whether M/&As create value, whose difference of conclusions verifies the importance of government control factor in Chinese control right markets. Original motive and path dependence of government control are to reduce social burden, but the methods of government control changes in tender offers of listed companies in China. Under this system background, it's favorable for exploring mechanism of M/&As and standardizing companies' behavior to research acquiring models and corporate performance under government control. Along the route of "control right /(origin/)-government control /(motive/)-acquiring model /(behavior/)-corporate performance /(result/)", this thesis examines acquiring models and corporate performance under government control in firm nature, administration level, pyramidal layer, control form, control shareholding and district difference. Main contributions include microcosmic-motive angle of government control, government -behavior characteristic of acquiring model, empirical evidence of performance-influenced path and match of data. The reasoning indicates, the essence of government control right is divisible real control right; the methods of government control based on divisible government control right imply different motives from which government control M/&As; positive effect and negative effect of government control coexist, which agent problems such as multiple governing targets, cheap voting rights and rent seeking, deriving from separation between formal residual rights and government control right, are origins of which government excessively intervenes M/&As and makes their performance low. Empirical evidence shows, industrial attribute of M/&As depends on firm nature and administration level; relative attribute depends on firm nature, control form and control shareholding; govern district attribute depends on firm nature, administration level, and district difference. The whole performance verifies two paradoxes, but is insignificantly related to relative attribute and govern district attribute; Acquiring models influence performance under government control, verifying motives of government control. Positive effect of government control is that restraint of high-level government to excessive diversification of companies and synergy motive of diversified M/&As in companies governed by high-level government coexist, while negative effect is as follows: damage effect of excessive diversification exists in companies governed by low-level government; report recombination through relative M/&As is opportunism of internal capital market for government; a local government transfers economic burden to companies governed by central government and props listed companies governed by that government; control shareholding is related to the probability of report recombination through relative M/&As; the government in government-high-intervention district encourages local companies acquire nonlocal ones, but restrains reverse acquiring. So, the key for developing function of M/&As is to avoid excessive intervention of government, while basic principles are to orientate reasonably government function, reduce state-owned shares, foster responsible blockholders, strengthen security supervision and institutional investors' control, and improve corporate governance.

关 键 词： 中国上市公司 政府控制 并购动因 并购模式 公司绩效

分 类 号： [F271 F276.6 F224]

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]