作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《工业工程与管理》 2004年第5期53-57,共5页

摘　　要： 在博弈论的框架下对上市公司质量监控进行了分析,得出现实生活中上市公司的质量欺骗是不可避免的,它的存在正是博弈均衡的必然结果,并给出了上述结论的证明;同时,分析了一些关键因素(如监管机构对上市公司的惩罚系数及监控成本,上市公司的质量欺骗额等)对均衡结果的影响,提出了减少质量欺骗发生的建议。文中结论与我们关于检查技术和监控成本的假设有关。 The listed firms' quality monitoring is analyzed by using the game theory. The models of one-stage game and multistage games are established, which are based on the different hypotheses between government monitoring regulation and listed firms. The equilibrium strategy is deduced. It is found out that almost impossible to eliminate the phenomena of quality cheating, i.e. false information revelation. Some key factors including the mulct coefficient that the government monitoring regulation punishes listed firms,monitoring cost and cheat amount are also discussed. The suggestions to reduce listed firms' quality cheating are set forth. But, the above mentioned conclusions are just suitable under the hypotheses about the check technology and the monitoring cost.

关 键 词： 质量 监控 信息披露 博弈

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]