机构地区: 西南财经大学会计学院
出 处: 《经济经纬》 2015年第2期99-104,共6页
摘 要: 代理问题是我国国有企业费用普遍存在"粘性"的主要成因,而高管薪酬激励被认为是缓解代理问题的重要机制。鉴于此,笔者实证检验了国有企业高管薪酬激励对费用粘性的影响。结果发现:国有企业存在费用粘性,并且该现象主要源自管理层的机会主义行为;高管薪酬激励有助于缓和代理问题引起的费用粘性,同时良好的公司治理环境能够增强高管薪酬激励在降低费用粘性时的效果。进一步的研究发现,高管薪酬激励作用的发挥因国有企业控制层级的不同而存在差异。 Agency problem is the main cause of cost stickiness in state-owned enterprise ( SOE) . Executive compensation incentives are expected to be an important mechanism to alleviate the agency problem. In view of this,we investigate the effect of executive compensa-tion on cost stickiness. We find that,cost stickiness exists in Chinese SOE,and this phenomenon is mainly derived from managers’ op-portunistic behavior. Executive compensation incentives can mitigate cost stickiness caused by agency problem,and good corporate gov-ernance environment can enhance the effect of executive compensation on reducing cost stickiness. Further study finds that the effect of executive compensation incentive varies by the different level of government control over SOE.
关 键 词: 费用粘性 代理问题 高管薪酬 公司治理 政府控制
领 域: [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]